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Abstract
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) have argued in the context of the North American
Free Trade Agreement that US outsourcing to Mexico leads to an increase in the
skill premium in both the US and Mexico. In this paper we show on the example of
Austria and Poland that with the new international division of labor emerging in
Europe Austria, the high income country, is specializing in the low skill intensive
part of the value chain and Poland, the low income country, is specializing in the
high skill part. As a result, skilled workers in Austria are losing from outsourcing,
while gaining in Poland. In Austria, relative wages for human capital declined by 2
percent during 1995-2002 and increased by 41 percent during 1994-2002 in Poland.
In both countries outsourcing contributes roughly 35 percent to these changes in
the relative wages for skilled workers. Furthermore, we show that Austria’s R&D
policy has contributed to an increase in the skill premium there.
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1 Introduction
The debate about globalization has shifted recently to a new frontier. Firms
in rich countries are seen to outsource white color workers to India, China,
and to Eastern Europe raising fears that this will adversely affect the long
run growth potential of industrialized economies and will result in an increase
in unemployment of high skilled workers in Europe and in a decline in the
skill premium in the US.1 In a previous paper, Marin (2004) has shown that
German and Austrian firms offshore the skill intensive stages of production
to Eastern Europe relocating high skilled jobs to this region. She finds that
German affiliates in Eastern Europe are on average almost 3 times as skill
intensive compared to their parent companies in Germany. The skill intensity
of the off-shoring activity of Austrian firms is slightly above that of the
activity of parent firms in Austria.
In this paper we examine empirically whether outsourcing to New Europe
can explain changes in relative wages of skilled workers in Old and New
Europe.2 Figure 1 gives the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the last
decade in Germany and Austria on the one hand and in Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic on the other. We use as a proxy for the skill wage
ratio relative wages of non-production to production workers. The data show
a strong increase in the relative wage for skills in Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, while this ratio appears to have remained almost constant
in Germany and Austria.3
These wage data do not show a pattern of factor prices that trade economists
usually expect from trade and investment integration. Typically, when a skill
rich country like Germany (relative to Poland) integrates with a skill poor
country like Poland, we expect relative wages for skills to go up in Germany
and to decline in Poland. The reason is that trade integration leads a coun-
try to specialize in those sectors which use the country’s abundant factor
intensively. Thus, skill rich Germany specializes in the skill intensive sectors
and labor rich Poland specializes in labor intensive sectors. As a result the
relative demand for skills goes up in Germany and declines in Poland leading
1 The last Brookings Trade Forum in 2005 is devoted to the theme of Outsourcing of
White Collar Workers.
2For the New International Division of Labor in Europe, see Marin (2006).
3For an explanation of the evolution of the skill premium in Germany, see Marin and
Raubold (2005).
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to an increase in the relative wage for skills in Germany and to a decline of
those in Poland.
Figure 1: Relative Wages1 in Selected Countries
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Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Statistic Austria, Central Statistical Office of Poland
and PAIiIZ.
Why have relative wages for skilled workers increased in New Europe and
remained somewhat constant in Old Europe? Why do we observe a perverse
Stolper-Samuelson effect in these countries? We explore these questions on
the example of two countries from Old and New Europe: Austria and Poland.
Austria and Poland are no natural pair to consider. Although Austria’s
foreign direct investment to Poland accounts for 10.4 percent of total outgoing
Austrian FDI to Eastern Europe in 2002-2004 and has shown a tremendous
increase since the fall of communism (see Table 1), Austria’s share in total
incoming FDI in Poland is negligible (see Table 1). Still, we choose these
two countries, because Poland is the largest country in New Europe and
Austria is the country in Old Europe most integrated with New Europe.
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE) account for 58 percent
of total outgoing FDI in Austria in 2002-2004 (see Table 1).4
Table 2 takes a closer look at outsourcing in selected countries and the
development in their labor markets. With an annual growth rate of the skill
wage ratio of 4.4 percent, Poland shows the strongest increase in the skill
premium since the announcement of Eastern Enlargement. Compared to
4 In 2003 CEE accounted for 88% of total outgoing FDI in Austria, while only for 4%
in Germany (see Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2003)).
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Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment Pattern in Austria and Poland
Austria’s outgoing FDI Poland’s incoming FDI
1992-1994 2002-2004 1994-1996 2001-2003
CEE 33.83 58.00 7.86 19.07 France
Hungary 18.03 10.93 21.07 10.74 USA
Czech Rep. 9.87 7.19 14.27 13.94 Germany
Poland 0.59 10.40 7.81 18.08 Netherlands
Croatia 1.00 6.36 4.79 9.22 UK
Slovak Rep. 1.53 3.10 10.37 2.15 Italy
Slovenia 2.00 3.86 3.16 5.21 Sweden
Romania 0.18 10.35 0.51 7.96 Belgium
Russia 0.15 1.15 2.33 4.11 Denmark
Bulgaria 0.23 1.35 0.00 0.00 Russia
EU-15 35.24 28.30 1.07 0.45 Ireland
Germany 9.66 10.30 3.33 1.83 Switzerland
UK 6.67 3.52 1.31 -1.01 Austria
other 30.93 13.69 21.48 10.32 other
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 total
Notes: The numbers show the percentage distribution of foreign direct investment flows.
Countries are ranked according their average (1992-2004 for Austria and 1994-2003 for
Poland) importance as source and as host country, respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Austrian National Bank, OeNB, and the
Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, PAIiIZ.
Poland, Mexico’s increase in the relative wage for skills appears to be small
in face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The annual
increase in the skill premium in Germany and the US are of the same order
of magnitude, while Austria’s skill premium declined modestly.
At the same time, Austria and Poland experienced a sharp increase in
outsourcing between 1995 and 2002. In both countries outsourcing has grown
annually by 6 and 7 percent, respectively. This can also bee seen from Fig-
ure 2 which shows that the measure for outsourcing in Austria (the share
of imported inputs in percent of output) increased from 20 percent in 1990
to 30 percent in 2000, while remaining constant over the previous decade.
In Poland the measure of outsourcing (foreign assets in percent of domestic
3
assets) increased from 4 to 80 percent between 1994 and 2002. Thus, out-
sourcing is a candidate for explaining the evolution of the skill premia in
both countries.5
Table 2: Outsourcing and Labor Market Outcomes in Selected Countriesa
Poland Austria Germany USA Mexico
1994-2002 1995-2002 1990-2000 1979-1990 1975-1988
outsourcing 6.91d 6.01e - 4.67f 17.60g
relative wagesb 4.42 -0.29 0.71 0.72h 1.39i
relative employment b 1.22 1.97 2.01 - -
high-skilled workers’ wage sharec 3.74 1.14 1.56 1.27 1.50i
a annual growth rates
b non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and Mexico, in
mining and manufacturing for Austria
c (non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production
workers)/((non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production work-
ers)+(production to production workers’ wage*number of production to production workers)) in man-
ufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and Mexico, in mining and manufacturing for Austria
d 1+(foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets), manufacturing
e narrow definition of outsourcing: (imported inputs from own sector/value added of sector)*100,
mining and manufacturing
f (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manufacturing
g incoming FDI / total fixed investment
h weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments
i for US-Border region only, manufacturing
Source: Poland, Austria and Germany: own calculations; USA: data from Feenstra and Hanson (1996b);
Mexico: data from Feenstra and Hanson (1997).
This paper explores the role of outsourcing for the decline in the skill
premium in Austria and for the increase of the skill premium in Poland. In
Section 2 and Section 3 we develop the theoretical framework and its em-
pirical implementation along the lines of Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1997)
who have argued that the increase in the skill premium in the US as well as
in Mexico in face of NAFTA can be explained by capital movements in the
form of foreign direct investment from the US to Mexico. US multinationals
started to outsource the labor intensive stages of production to Mexico. The
so called maquiladoras emerged in Mexico. Maquiladoras are affiliates of US
multinationals in Mexico which specialize in the low skill intensive part of the
value chain. US multinationals’ outsourcing activities to Mexico leads rela-
tive wages for skills to increase in the US as well as Mexico. The increase in
5For the determinants of outsourcing see Marin (2006).
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Figure 2: Outsourcing in Austria and Poland
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the skill premium in Poland and its decline in Austria suggests that an inverse
maquiladoras effect is emerging in Austria and Poland. Austrian firms are
outsourcing the more skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe
and specializing in the more labor intensive stages of production in Austria
leading to a decline in the skill premium in Austria.6 Poland on the other
hand is receiving outsourcing of multinational activities from more skill rich
countries like the US, the Netherlands, and France resulting in an increase
in the skill premium in Poland. Section 4 examines whether such an inverse
maquiladoras effect can be identified for Austria and whether the decline in
the skill premium in Austria can be attributed to outsourcing. Section 5
then examines whether multinational outsourcing has been contributing to
the increase in the skill premium in Poland. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Framework
In the Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) model, the world economy consists
of two countries: North and South. Each country is endowed with three
factors of production: capital, high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor. These
endowments are assumed to be sufficiently different so that factor prices are
not equalized. Returns to capital and the relative wage of high-skilled labor
are assumed to be higher in the South, reflecting a relative scarcity of capital
6Marin (2004) shows that Austria is poor in skills relative to Eastern Europe.
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Figure 1. Outsourcing from North to South.
10 z*
CS
CS
CN
CN
z‘ z
C
Figure 3: Outsourcing from the North to the South.
and high-skilled labor in the South. Initially, there is no international factor
mobility, but labor mobility between skill categories within each country. In
other words, the supply of skilled and unskilled workers can react to changes
in the relative wages. On the production side there is a single final good
assembled from a continuous range of intermediate inputs at no additional
cost. These inputs are produced using all factors and differ only with regard
to the relative amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled labor engaged in their
production since capital enters the production function with the same cost
share for all inputs. They are indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] and ranked in a way that
high-skilled labor intensity is increasing with z. Assuming that for constant
wages the minimum cost of producing one unit of input is a continuous
function of z and that all inputs are produced in both countries, Figure 3
depicts the minimum cost locus for intermediate goods produced in the North
( CNCN) and in the South (CSCS).
z∗ is defined as the ”cutoff intermediate input” where the minimum pro-
duction cost in the South and the North is equal. CSCS lies below CNCN to
the left of z∗ since the relative wage of low-skilled labor, which is relatively
intensive used in the production of these inputs, is lower in the South. The
opposite holds for intermediates lying to the right of z∗. Thus, the South
has a cost advantage in producing inputs, which are relatively low-skilled
labor intensive and the North has a cost advantage producing inputs which
are relatively high-skill intensive. The following trade pattern emerges: the
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South exports intermediate goods in the range z ∈ [0, z∗) while the North
exports those in the range z ∈ (z∗, 1].
What will happen in the model if Northern firms are allowed to invest
in the South? They will have an incentive to do so in order to earn the
higher returns to capital in the South. The flow of capital from the North
to the South will cause a reduction in the Southern return to capital and an
increase in return to capital in the North. Consequently, at constant wages,
this change will alter the minimum cost loci shown in Figure 3. CSCS will
move down and CNCN up increasing the critical value of z∗ to z′. That is, the
production of inputs in range [z∗, z′) now will take place in the South rather
than in the North. In other words, in the South, the range of intermediate
production will spread toward inputs that engage a higher ratio of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor. The inputs, which still will be produced in the
North, will use a higher ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor relative to
those that will leave. Therefore, both countries will experience an increase
in the average skill intensity of production and an increase in the relative
demand for high-skilled labor. As a result, the relative wage of skilled labor
will rise in both countries. Summing up, z∗ is increasing with the Southern
to Northern capital ratio. Thus, the relative wage of skilled workers will be
positively affected by accumulation of capital in the South relative to the
North. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) show that this result also holds for
exogenous relative capital accumulation in the South not necessarily caused
by Northern firms’ investment.
Following Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) interpretation of the model,
the activities which are outsourced by industrialized countries to developing
countries are relatively low-skilled from the perspective of the home country
and relatively high-skilled for the host country. Thus, outsourcing increases
the relative demand for high-skilled workers in both countries resulting in a
higher relative wage for high-skilled labor.
3 The Empirical Model
The model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) provides a formalization of the
idea that outsourcing induces a shift in the factor intensities in domestic and
foreign production. As described in the previous section, the countries are -
by assumption - endowed with three factors of production: low-skilled labor,
high-skilled labor and capital. In the production process these three factors
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are combined, which leads to the following unit variable cost function for
each sector i and for each point in time t :
cvit = cv(w
LS
it , w
HS
it , rit, OUTSOURCit, TECHit) (1)
We include in addition to the factor prices wLS, wHS and rit two variables:
outsourcing (OUTSOURC) and technical change (TECH). Following the
existing literature, the inclusion of outsourcing as well as technical progress
in the unit cost function is justified by arguing that merely including the
factors of production will not capture other factors which might influence
the production costs. In this context outsourcing can be thought as a form
of technical change since it acts as an “endogenous technical change”.7
Berman et al (1994) suggested that a translog cost function can be derived
from the unit cost function. Assuming capital as a fixed factor of production,
the differentiation of the translog cost function with respect to the prices of
the variable factors, wLS and wHS, gives the factor demand equation in the
form of the factor’s share in total variable cost. In our analysis the factor’s
share in total variable cost is defined as the high-skilled workers’ wage bill in
the total wage bill. This wage bill share of the high-skilled workers (WBSHS)
measures the relative demand for high-skilled labor. From this we receive the
following estimating equation:
WBSHSit = β0 + β1lnYit + β2lnKit + β3OUTSOURCit
+ β4TECHit + uit (2)
The dependent variable in this equation is a composite measure. It incor-
porates relative wages of non-production workers as well as their relative
employment.
4 Outsourcing in Austria
In this section we analyze the consequences of increased competition due to
imported intermediate goods for the Austrian labor market. Particularly,
we want to address the question of how international outsourcing affects the
demand for high-skilled labor in Austria. What is an appropriate measure of
this competition in imported inputs? In the existing literature, there are two
definitions known that use the data of input-output tables: wide and narrow
7 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).
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definitions of outsourcing. The wide definition refers to the intermediate
goods that a particular sector imports from all sectors all over the world. In
contrast, the narrow definition of outsourcing is related just to the imported
inputs from the firm’s own sector. The reasoning for favoring the latter
definition is that the workers of a particular sector might be solely affected
by decisions of firms at the sectoral level over “make or buy” inputs.8 Firms of
a particular sector are not able to produce inputs that they buy from other
sectors. Therefore, the factor intensities and the demand for high-skilled
labor should not be affected by the decision if inputs from other sectors are
sourced domestically or from abroad. In this paper we will use therefore the
narrow definition of international outsourcing.
4.1 Data and Variables
The sample includes annual data of 15 industrial sectors that are pooled over
the years 1995-2002. The sectors are classified according to the European
NACE system at the 2-letter level.9 The sample period starts in the year
1995, because consistent data with respect to sector classification are only
available for the years after Austria’s accession to the EU.
The labor demand data are taken form the Association of Austrian Social
Insurance. The skill levels are proxied by the commonly used broad definition
of production (“Arbeiter”) and non-production workers (“Angestellte”) for
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The statistics show the wages and the
employment separately for production and non-production workers.
We define the variable international outsourcing OUTS as the share of
imported inputs in value added. The narrow definition of outsourcing takes
the imported inputs of the own NACE 2-letter sector into account. Some
other studies are using the imported intermediate inputs a a share of the sum
of domestic and imported inputs.10 The advantage of our measure OUTS is
that it controls for changes in the degree of value added, and consequently, for
overall changes in the use of intermediate goods. Since we want to analyze the
importance of outsourcing for the labor market, it might not be appropriate
to look just at the relative importance of imported inputs compared to total
inputs.
As control variables, we use data on output Y , value added V A, and
8See Geishecker (2002).
9The considered sectors belong to NACE C and D.
10See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) and Geishecker (2002).
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gross fixed capital formation K from the OCED STAN database. Since
no industry-level measure of capital stocks is available,11 we use gross fixed
capital formation data to construct a measure for the capital stocks. For this
calculation, we employ the perpetual inventory method.
Technical change is proxied by the variable R&D L measuring the R&D
personnel as a proportion of the sector’s employment.
See the Data Appendix for further description of the data and their
sources.
4.2 Empirical Results
We estimate our equation with fixed effects, since any variation between units
not accounted for by the independent variables creates unobserved hetero-
geneity in the model. Given that industries differ from each other in the
characteristics not included in our empirical model, estimating with OLS
would relegate the omitted heterogeneity to the error term and the coeffi-
cients would be biased.12 Furthermore, we also incorporate time fixed effects.
This is important, since we have neglected the fact, that the international
outsourcing might be determined by some foreign factors. Due to obvious
reasons we cannot include these variables in the regression. By inclusion
of time dummies, we assume that the foreign variables’ impact is the same
across industries and varies only over time. Moreover, there might exist
some aggregate exogenous factors that are correlated with the industry-level
relative labor demand.
Not surprisingly, statistical tests show that there is a heteroscedasticity
problem plaguing our data. In order to assure the efficiency of diagnostic tests
all standard errors reported in the results are robust to heteroscedasticity.
We first estimate our basic equation (2) with the wage bill share as the
dependent variable in Table 3.
In column (1) of Table 3, the wage bill share of the high-skilled workers
WBS is regressed on OUTS and the control variables, Y and the capital
output ratio K/Y . The results suggest that outsourcing has a significant
negative effect on the demand for high-skilled labor. Thus, rather than saving
11Data of capital stocks are available at the aggregated level of ISIC 1-letter sectors for
the years 1988 to 2000.
12The big advantage of the fixed effects versus random effects is that any potential
correlation of the explanatory variables with the individual effects is rendered harmless
since the fixed effects and therefore their correlation with the explanatory variables are
annihilated.
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Table 3: Outsourcing and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Austria
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTS - 0.018* - 0.030** - 0.034*** - 0.036***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Y 3.999* 4.256** 3.721* 2.704
(2.100) (1.962) (1.964) (2.031)
ln K/Y 3.440* 4.740** 4.098* 2.826
(2.059) (2.064) (2.067) (2.098)
R&D L 0.414** 0.362* 0.365**
(0.198) (0.183) (0.179)
R&D SUB 0.829*** 0.974***
(0.303) (0.311)
FDI L - 0.039**
(0.019)
constant - 3.647 - 11.677 - 4.552 10.394
(25.443) (24.341) (24.353) (25.474)
Adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 120 120 120 120
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates significance
at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are defined as follows: wage bill share = (wage bill of non-production
workers/industry wage bill)*100; OUTS = (imported inputs from own sector/value
added)*100; ln Y = log real output; ln K/Y = log [(capital/output)*100]; R&D
L = (R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value
added)*100; FDI L = (employment in foreign affiliates in Austria/employment)*100.
on low skilled labor as is commonly assumed, outsourcing saves on high skilled
labor relative to low skilled labor. Furthermore, the sector’s output and
capital output ratio have a positive impact on the non-production workers’
share of the wage bill.13 This suggest that the output elasticity is higher for
high-skilled labor than for low-skilled labor.
Additionally, specification (2) includes theR&D L as a proxy for technical
change,14 which is positively signed and statistically significant at the five
13 We have also run all the regressions with investments (gross fixed capital formation)
instead of capital stocks, but the results are very similar.
14 The regressions are also carried out with data on R&D expenditures relative to value
added. The results for the estimated coefficients (not reported here) are very similar to
those for R&D employment.
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percent level. This indicates that labor saving technical change shifts the
demand toward non-production workers. It is interesting to note that the
inclusion of R&D L in column (2) magnifies the negative impact of OUTS
on high skilled labor and raises the significance to the 5 percent level.
We include two additional variables R&D SUB and FDI L in the regres-
sion to control for further factors which may have put pressure on the relative
demand for skilled labor in Austria. R&D SUB measures public subsidies to
the private sector in percent of value added. The reason why we include this
variable in the regression is that the government in Austria pursued an active
technology policy driving up relative wages of skilled labor in Austria. R&D
SUB is supposed to control for this policy induced effect on relative wages of
skilled workers.15 Compared to other OECD countries, governmental R&D
policy plays an important role in Austria. In 2001, 38.2 percent of R&D
expenditures are financed by the government, whereas only 29.1 percent of
R&D expenditures are state-financed on OECD average. Since these state-
financed R&D expenditures are used as a policy instrument, they might be
unequally distributed among sectors. As a proxy for R&D subsidies we use
in our analysis the R&D subsidies of the state-owned research foundation for
enterprises (”O¨sterreichische Forschungsfo¨rderungsgesellschaft”). The subsi-
dies vary from 2.3 percent of the sector’s R&D expenditures in the coke and
oil sector to 21.6 percent in the wood sector.
Table 4: Who Contributes to R&D
Financing R&D in 2001 (in percent)
Austria USA France Japan Finland
State Aid 38.2 27.8 36.9 18.5 25.5
Domestic Firms 41.8 67.3 54.2 73 70.8
Foreign Firms 19.7 - 7.2 0.4 2.5
Source: Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
The positive and highly significant coefficient on R&D SUB indicates
that an increase of state-aided R&D expenditures in percent of value added
15For the R&D policy induced effect on relative wages for skilled workers in Austria see
Marin (1995). She shows that the same policy has contributed to the slowing of the speed
by which the pattern of trade moved up the technological ladder in Austria.
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by 1 percentage point is pushing up the relative wage bill of high-skilled
workers by 0.83 percentage points. The technology policy effect on the rela-
tive wage bill of skilled workers is of much larger magnitude than the effect of
technical change and outsourcing. Furthermore, the inclusion of R&DSUB
increases the statistical significance of OUTS to the 1 percent level.
In the last specification of Table 3, we include FDI L measuring the
percent of employment of foreign affiliates in Austria by sector. The reason
why we include this variable is that foreign firms play an important role in
the R&D and trade activity taking place in Austria. In 2001, 20 percent
of R&D expenditures is financed by foreign firms (see Table 4). This share
is the largest one among OECD countries.16 In addition, foreign affiliates
in Austria generate a large share of Austrian imports. Table 5 shows, that
around one third of all imports are done by foreign multinationals in Austria.
The presence of foreign firms in Austria varies strongly according to the
sector. The share of employment of foreign affiliates in percent of sector’s
employment ranges from 3.8 percent in the furniture sector to 70 percent in
the coke and oil sector.17
Table 5: Role of Foreign Firms for Foreign Trade and the Austrian Labor
Market
1995 1998 2002
share of FDI employment in total employment 16.26 17.00 16.65
share of FDI-Imports in total imports - 21.75 32.08
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Austrian National Bank, OeNB, the
OECD STAN database, and Eurostat Comext data base.
Foreign multinationals tend to increase the relative demand for unskilled
labor in Austria suggesting that they invest in unskilled labor intensive sec-
tors. This is consistent with the fact that Austria is a relatively human
capital poor country.18 The estimated coefficient on FDI L is negative and
significant at the 5 percent level. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of
imported inputs (OUTS) and in the share of employment in foreign multina-
16 In the EU-15 countries 7.7 percent of the R&D activity is undertaken by foreign
multinationals. See Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
17 The numbers show averages for 1995 to 2002.
18 For a comparison of Austria’s skill endowment with other OECD and Eastern Euro-
pean countries see Marin (2004).
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tionals in Austria lowers the relative demand for high skilled labor by about
0.04 percentage points.
The economic impact of international outsourcing implied by these esti-
mates is substantial over the considered period. The observed increase in the
non-production wage bill share in the period 1995 to 2002 is 3.36. Multiply-
ing the coefficient on outsourcing from column 4 by the change in outsourcing
(12.67 percentage points) and dividing this by the change in the wage bill
share [(-0.036*12.67)/3.36] results in a negative contribution of 0.136. This
implies that the wage bill share of human capital would have increased by
13.6 percent more in the absence of outsourcing in the last decade.
Table 6: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor in
Austria
dependent variables: (1)-(3): relative wages, (4)-(6): relative employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTS - 0.155*** - 0.148*** - 0.179*** - 0.109* - 0.149** - 0.142***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.051)
ln VA - 20.131** - 27.179*** - 22.592*** 67.617*** 52.529*** 66.058***
(8.557) (9.386) (8.270) (14.162) (9.758) (15.608)
ln K/VA - 17.521* - 22.064** - 19.831** 57.372*** 51.123*** 54.806***
(9.145) (9.115) (8.724) (10.280) (7.831) (11.164)
R&D L 2.637* 3.074***
(1.516) (1.073)
R&D SUB 2.349 4.923**
(1.664) (2.025)
constant 449.505*** 520.155*** 480.238*** - 721.512*** - 582.880*** - 697.668***
(104.218) (109.201) (100.009) (152.852) (106.720) (168.349)
Adj. R2 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.994 0.995 0.994
N 96 96 96 120 120 120
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies
are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are defined as follows: relative wages = (70-percentile wage of non-production
workers/30-percentile of production workers)*100; relative employment = (number of non-
production workers/number of production workers)*100; OUTS = (imported inputs from own
sector/value added)*100; ln VA = log real value added; ln K/Y = log [(capital/value added)*100];
R&D L = (R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value added)*100;
FDI L = (employment in foreign affiliates in Austria/employment)*100.
How robust are these results? A decomposition of the wage bill share
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into relative wages and relative employment may deliver interesting insights.
In Table 6, we replace the dependent variable wage bill share with the new
dependent variables, relative wages and relative employment of high-skilled
labor, respectively. We then run similar regressions as in Table 3. The
coefficient on OUTS is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level in all three relative wage regressions and somewhat less significant in
the relative employment regressions.
The R&D measures have a strong and significant impact on the relative
employment. The R&D L ratio and the R&D SUB influence the relative
employment of high-skilled workers positively, whereas the FDI L ratio has
a strong negative impact, which is not reported in the table. These variables,
however, have only a minor effect on relative wages.
International outsourcing can explain 38 percent of the decrease in the
wage gap between the 70-percentile of the non-production workers and the
30-percentile wage of the production workers. Relative employment would
have grown by 24 percent more in the absence of outsourcing activities that
occurred in the considered period of 8 years. As shown in Table 6 outsourcing
has a negative impact on relative wages, as well as on relative employment.
However, while the wage gap is decreasing, outsourcing contributes signifi-
cantly to this development, and it acts against the rise in relative employ-
ment.
5 Multinational Outsourcing to Poland
In this section we investigate how outsourcing by foreign firms has affected
the evolution of the skill-premium in Poland. We capture outsourcing of
foreign firms to Poland by the share of foreign-owned fixed assets in domestic
fixed assets (1+
KFDIit
KDit
). This measure arises from disaggregating of the capital
stock (K) into domestic capital ( KD) and foreign capital (KFDI).19
5.1 Variables and Data
We study the relative labor demand for skilled workers in Poland on the
manufacturing industry. Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel 20
of 23 ISIC industries over a 9 years’ period (1994-2002).21 We measure the
19ln(KD +KFDI) = ln(KD) + ln(1 + K
FDI
it
KDit
)
20 Some numbers are not made public for confidentiality reasons.
21 Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) examine a similar question for the three countries
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, they have data on 6 ISIC industries,
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employment of high-skilled (low-skilled) workers as an annual average em-
ployment of non-production (production) workers, and the wage of skilled
(unskilled) workers as an annual average gross wage of non-production (pro-
duction) workers. Unfortunately, especially at the level of disaggregation we
use in our empirical work, no better proxies for high-skilled and low-skilled
labor are available. Hence, the high-skilled labor wage share is measured as
the non-production workers’ wage share in the total wage bill.
Our data allow us to separate foreign and domestic owned fixed assets.
22 To control for the restructuring processes in Polish manufacturing we add
the share of private firms in total number of manufacturing firms (PRIV ).
We assume that private enterprises have stronger incentives to rationalize
and modernize their production than their public counterparts so that their
activities might have affected the relative high-skilled labor demand. Fur-
thermore, we include the variables R&D expenditures share in sales (R&D)
and the import and export shares in sales (M and X). R&D is supposed to
account for technological improvements and M and X capture the potential
influence of international integration and of the exposure to international
competition. Finally, as the total labor cost function condition on total out-
put, it is common practice to include output in this type of the regression.
However, due to high correlation between output (measured by sales) and
domestic fixed assets, which enters the regression in levels, we excluded the
former variable from regression. Nevertheless, accounting for industry and
time fixed effects helps to resolve potential problems arising from omitting
output in the regression. Thus our modified estimating equation is:
WBSHSit = α1 + α2ln(1 +
KFDIit
KDit
) + α3lnK
D
it + α4lnPRIVit
+ α5lnR&Dit + α6lnMit + α7lnXit + it (3)
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 7 reports the fixed effects estimation results for the wage share of
high-skilled labor. Columns (1) presents the basic specification with the
two independent variables: foreign (1 + K
FDI
KD
) and domestic capital (KD).
Columns (2) to (4) present the results when adding several control variables
only over the period 1994 to 2001.
22 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for lack of data could not directly measure the capital
stock in foreign ownership and thus used the number of foreign firms as a proxy. Bruno,
Crino and Falzoni (2004) measure foreign capital with foreign direct investment stock.
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to the basic specification. The coefficient on the foreign capital variable is
positive and statistically significant in all regressions. Its magnitude ranges
from 0.029 to 0.044. But what is actually interesting is its economic signif-
icance. Multiplying the most conservative estimate of the coefficient of the
foreign fixed assets (0.029) with the average growth of the share of foreign
fixed assets between 1994 and 2002 (116.5 percent). The obtained number
(0.034), is the contribution of foreign capital to changes in relative demand
for skills. It implies that FDI can account for at least 34 percent of the ob-
served increase in non-production workers’ wage share (0.099) in the Polish
manufacturing sector between 1994 and 2002.
The coefficient of domestic capital is also positive in all specifications but
not statistically significant. The sign of domestic capital coefficient corrobo-
rates the theoretical result, that any accumulation of capital, be it domestic-
or foreign-owned, leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor.
Its statistical insignificance, however, underlines the special role of foreign
capital for the changes in relative high-skilled labor demand.
The inclusion of control variables does not change the results obtained
for the basic regressors. PRIV has a positive and significant impact on the
high-skilled wage share. The result on the R&D variable suggests that the
increase in the relative high-skilled labor demand was partly due to a tech-
nological upgrading. The negative coefficient on the import share can be
seen from the Heckscher-Ohlin perspective. Given that Poland is low-skilled
labor abundant compared to its trading partners, international trade would
exert a downward pressure on earnings of high-skilled workers relative to
the earnings of low-skilled workers. Nevertheless, the result on the export
share is inconclusive. Finally, the inclusion of time dummies is crucial when
analyzing the role of outsourcing for the skilled workers’ relative demand in
Poland. We should not forget that Poland is a transition economy with in-
stitutions and the economic system as a whole being still “work in progress”.
The positive coefficient on the year dummies suggests that the transition to
market economy, has favored high-skilled workers.
In the remaining specifications of Table 7 we substitute (1+K
FDI
KD
) with the
ratio of the number of foreign to domestic firms (1 + E
FDI
ED
). An inspection
of columns (5) to (8) shows that the results are robust to this alternative
measure of outsourcing.
In Table 8 we replace the wage share of high-skilled workers as depen-
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Table 7: Foreign Investors and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Poland
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) 0.044*** 0.048** 0.046** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
ln (1 + E
FDI
ED
) 0.114* 0.141*** 0.124** 0.107***
(0.062) (0.049) (0.048) (0.039)
ln KD 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
ln PRIV 0.041** 0.036** 0.043** 0.045** 0.042* 0.050**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
ln R&D 0.008** 0.007** 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln M -0.046*** -0.053***
(0.011) (0.012)
ln X 0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.016)
year dummies yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant 0.365 -0.004 0.041 0.237 0.251 0.223 0.163 0.321
(0.332) (0.276) (0.273) (0.259) (0.335) (0.293) (0.298) (0.238)
Adj. R2 0.917 0.920 0.920 0.926 0.910 0.931 0.918 0.949
N 194 192 185 171 194 192 185 171
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are
included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are defined as follows: wage bill share = wage bill of non-production workers/manufacturing
wage bill; ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) = log [1 + (foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets)]; ln (1 + E
FDI
ED
) = log
[1 + (number of foreign firms/number of domestic)]; ln KD = log (domestic fixed assets); ln PRIV =
log (number of private firms/total number of firms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M =
log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
dent variable by decomposing it into relative employment and wages of non-
production workers. As can be seen, the result for the relative employment
practically mirror those for the wage share. Only the magnitude of the coef-
ficients is twice as high (in case of R&D even triple) and the year dummies
loose their significance. The regressions with high-skilled workers’ relative
wages in columns (5) to (8) give a different picture. The coefficients on do-
mestic capital become significant at one-percent level, while the influence of
privatization becomes negative and not significant. R&D retains its positive
sign but it is no more significant, whereas year dummies are positive and
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Table 8: Foreign Investors and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor
in Poland
dependent variables: (1)-(4): relative employment, (5)-(8): relative wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) 0.083** 0.094** 0.090** 0.045 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051)
ln KD 0.056 0.068 0.069 0.039 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.166***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.035) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
ln PRIV 0.095** 0.083* 0.102** -0.023 -0.034 -0.039
(0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.052) (0.055)
ln R&D 0.027** 0.025** 0.006 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
ln M -0.119*** -0.011
(0.021) (0.056)
ln X 0.026 0.005
(0.047) (0.069)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant -0.835 -1.010 -0.861 -0.376 -1.042 -1.902 -1.746 -1.996
(1.024) (0.907) (0.879) (0.876) (1.743) (0.826) (0.877) (1.231)
Adj. R2 0.836 0.838 0.837 0.847 0.773 0.769 0.771 0.775
N 194 192 185 171 194 192 185 171
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are
included but for expositional ease are not shown. Variables are defined as follows: relative employment
= number of non-production workers/number of production workers; relative wage = wage of non-
production workers/wage of production workers; ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) = log [1 + (foreign fixed assets/domestic
fixed assets)]; ln KD = log (domestic fixed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private firms/total number
of firms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
highly significant.
The different results on the time dummies is not surprising. Under the so-
cialist regime Poland had an extremely compressed wage distribution. Thus,
one of the dimensions of the transition process was the liberalization of wage
setting schemes. In the regression with relative wages significant and pos-
itive time dummies may reflect the labor market adjustments to a market
economy. Meanwhile, the relative employment underwent changes which
were rather industry specific and therefore, better captured by privatization
advances. The main message of this Table, is the positive and significant im-
pact of foreign capital (1 + K
FDI
KD
) on relative wages and the positive though
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less statistically significant impact on relative employment of non-production
workers.
5.3 Robustness
Some studies additionally include relative wages of high-skilled workers as an
independent variable arguing that they are of importance by factor supply
and demand decisions. The relative wages of high-skilled workers are likely
to be endogenous in wage share regression, and a failure to control for this
may lead to simultaneity bias. So far we have just ignored potential influence
of relative wages. Such approach, however, may cause an omitted variable
bias. It is therefore necessary to verify the robustness of the OLS estimates
with instrumental variables method.
We include the second and third lags of relative wages as instruments
additionally to other right hand side variables. It is also likely that foreign
capital is endogenous. Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) and Pavcnik (2003)
argue that foreign firms invest in some industries because of their high-skill
intensity not the other way round. Tests for exogeneity, indeed, indicated
that both relative wages and foreign capital variable are endogenous. There-
fore, we also added first, second and third lags of foreign capital variable
to the existing set of instruments. For the purpose of controlling for het-
eroscedasticity, we apply General Method of Moments (GMM) estimates.
Table B.2 in the Appendix shows IV-GMM results for the high-skilled
workers’ wage share. First of all, the coefficients on foreign capital remain
positive, of the same value and statistically significant. The inclusion of
relative wages, however, deprived privatization and year dummies of their
explanatory power. Regarding year dummies we have actually excluded
them from the regression, since their presence led to rejection of the joint
hypothesis of correct model specification and orthogonality conditions. This
corroborates the above result that the transition process is partly responsible
for the increase in non-production workers wage share, because it liberalized
the wage setting mechanism.
Turning to Table B.3 in the Appendix reporting IV-GMM results for rel-
ative employment and wage, the inclusion of relative wages to the regression
has similar consequences for relative employment as for relative demand with
one major difference. Increasing relative wages have slightly (statistically in-
significantly) retarded the increase of relative employment of non-production
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workers. Regarding relative wages, their development was driven mainly by
foreign capital and aggregate shocks related to the transition process.
We also carried out the regression with all independent variables lagged
one period, as Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) did in order to compare
their results with ours. The results for the two approaches differ in the
value of coefficients of foreign capital variable. They are higher when using
lags. We also reestimated our regressions with panel-corrected standard error
estimation (PCSE), which allows correction for contemporaneous correlation
across cross-sectional units and for autocorrelation. The results are similar
to those presented in the paper.23
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the importance of outsourcing for the labor
market outcome in Austria and Poland prior to Eastern Enlargement. In
contrast to other studies on the topic we find that outsourcing has lowered the
skill premium in Austria, the high income country, while it has increased the
wage gap in Poland, the low income country. We summarize our findings in
Table 9. We also contrast our results with the empirical findings of Feenstra
and Hanson (1997) for the US and Mexico. We report numbers for all four
countries prior to Eastern Enlargement and to NAFTA. Austria and Poland
liberalized their trade and investment regime in the 1990s after the fall of
communism. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) report their numbers for Mexico
in 1975-88 and for the US in 1979-1990. Several points are noteworthy from
the Table 9.
First, Poland experienced the largest increase in outsourcing compared
to Austria and the US. In the period 1994 to 2002 outsourcing in Poland
(as measured by the ratio of foreign to domestic assets) has increased by
71 percent, in Austria outsourcing (as measured by the share of imported
inputs in percent of value added) has increased by 50 percent in the period
1995 to 2002. In the US outsourcing (as measured by the share of imported
inputs in total inputs excluding energy) has risen by 51 percent in the period
1979 to 1990. Both low income countries, Poland and Mexico, experienced
an increase in their skill premium, but Poland’s rise in the skill premium was
more than twice as large (41 percent between 1994 to 2002) compared to
23 The results of PCSE and regressions with lagged independent variables are available
form the authors upon the request.
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Table 9: The Contribution of Outsourcing to Wage Inequality in Selected
Countries
Poland Mexico Austria USA
1994-2002 1975-1988 1995-2002 1979-1990
changes (in percent)
outsourcing 70.61a - 50.45b 50.98c
wage bill shared 34.18 21.35 8.29 19.92
relative wagese 41.39 19.63 -2.00 -
relative employmente 10.23 - 16.89 -
contribution of outsourcing (in percent)
wage bill shared 34.1 - 51.8 52.4 - 56.2 6.8 - 13.6 30.9 - 51.3
relative wages e 33.3 - 35.9 - 33.0 - 38.1 -
relative employment e 181.0 - 378.1 - 18.4 - 25.2 -
a 1+(foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets), manufacturing
b narrow definition of outsourcing: (imported inputs from own sector/value added of sec-
tor)*100, mining and manufacturing
c (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manu-
facturing
d (non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production
workers)/((non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to pro-
duction workers)+(production to production workers’ wage*number of production to pro-
duction workers)) in manufacturing for Poland, USA and Mexico, in mining and manufac-
turing for Austria
e non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and
Mexico, in mining and manufacturing for Austria
Source: Poland: own calculations; Mexico: Feenstra and Hanson (1997); USA: calculations
taken from Feenstra and Hanson (1996); Austria: own calculations.
Mexico’s (19.6 percent between 1975 to 1988). Second, in Austria, the high
income country, relative wages for skills declined by 2 percent in the period
1995 to 2002, while it increased by 41 percent in Poland, the low income
country. We suggest in the paper that this has happened in Austria, because
Austria is poor in human capital relative to its trading partners. We also show
that in the absence of an aggressive R&D policy pursued by the Austrian
government, the decline in the skill premium would have been much more
pronounced. Third, in spite of the larger increase of outsourcing in Poland
compared to Austria, outsourcing is as important in Austria as in Poland in
explaining the evolution of the skill premium. In both countries outsourcing
22
contributes roughly 35 percent to the change in the relative wage for skilled
workers. In other words, in the absence of outsourcing relative wages for
human capital would have declined by 35 percent less in Austria and they
would have increased by 35 percent less in Poland.
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Appendix
A Data
Notes on calculation of variables
wages: Since Austria’s wages are recorded according to at most to the social
security contribution ceiling, an accurate measure of mean wages is not pos-
sible. However, the statistics of the Association of Austrian Social Insurance
report different percentile wages for production and non-production workers.
imported intermediate goods: As in most countries, input-output tables
for Austria are not published annually. The most recent input-output ta-
bles available are from 1995 and 2000. We estimate the input-output tables
for the missing years by interpolating the input-output coefficients and mul-
tiplying them by imported inputs. These imported inputs result from the
interpolate share of intermediate goods in total imports. We receive the total
imports by transforming HS-classification import data at the 6-digit level to
NACE categories at 4-digit level. The import data in HS-classification are
taken from the Eurostat Comext database. Since the data on labor mar-
ket determine the level of sectoral aggregation, we aggregate the imported
inputs to the chosen NACE 2-letter level of analysis. Therefore, Austria’s
imports at the sectoral level formulate the estimated input-output tables for
the missing years.
capital stock: Gross fixed capital stocks are calculated according to the per-
petual inventory method using data on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF),
which are deflated by a general price index for investment goods.24 The ini-
tial capital stock for the year 1994, K1994, is estimated by using the values
of capital formation in the preceding years, 1990 to 1993.
K1994 = (GFCF1990 +GFCF1991 +GFCF1992 +GFCF1993 +GFCF1994)∗2
The gross fixed capital stocks for the sample period are calculated according
the following simple formula, assuming a constant depreciation rate of 10
percent.
Kt = 0.9 ∗Kt−1 +GFCFt
To check the validity of this estimation, we compare the aggregate estimate
for NACE D with the net capital stocks provided by Statistics Austria. The
size of these stocks differ somewhat, but the development is very similar.
24 For this calculation see Egger (2000).
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Table A.1: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
Austria
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ Association of Austrian
wage bill in total wage bill Social Insurance
relative wages 70-percentile non-production Association of Austrian
wage relative to 30-percentile production wage Social Insurance
relative non-production workers Association of Austrian
employment relative to production workers Social Insurance
OUTS share of imported inputs Statistics Austria
from the same NACE 2-letter (input-output table),
sector in value added, OECD STAN database
Y output (production), deflated OECD STAN database
by sector-specific producer price indices
VA value added, deflated OECD STAN database
by sector-specific producer price indices
K/Y ratio of gross fixed capital OECD STAN database
stock to output
K/VA ratio of gross fixed capital OECD STAN database
stock to value added,
R&D L share of R&D employment Eurostat,
in total employment, OECD STAN database
R&D SUB ratio of R&D subsidies Austrian Research
to value added Promotion Organization,
OECD STAN database
FDI L share of employment in foreign affiliates OeNB,
to total sector’s employment in Austria OECD STAN database
Poland
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ Polish Central
wage bill in total wage bill Statistical Office
relative wages non-production workers’ wages Polish Central
relative to production workers’ wages Statistical Office
relative number of non-production workers Polish Central
employment relative to production workers Statistical Office
(1 + K
FDI
KD
) one plus the share of foreign-owned Polish Central
fixed assets in domestic fixed assets Statistical Office
deflated by sector specific
producer price indices
(1 + E
FDI
ED
) one plus the ratio of number of foreign firms Polish Central
to domestic firms Statistical Office
KD domestic fixed assets Polish Central
Statistical Office
PRIV share of private firms Polish Central
in total number of firms Statistical Office
R&D share of R&D expenditures Polish Central
in sales Statistical Office
M share of imports in sales OECD STAN database
X share of exports in sales OECD STAN database
27
B Tables and Figures
Table B.2: Foreign Investors and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Poland
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln 1 + K
FDI
KD
0.040* 0.038* 0.035* 0.031*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015)
ln W
S
WUS
0.199** 0.191** 0.223*** 0.246**
(0.084) (0.091) (0.079) (0.096)
ln KD 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
ln PRIV -0.007 -0.011 -0.006
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
ln R&D 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
ln M -0.020*
(0.010)
ln X -0.002
(0.009)
year dummies no no no no
constant 0.059 0.336 -0.031 -0.027
(0.265) (0.204) (0.269) (0.251)
Centered R2 0.961 0.958 0.958 0.958
Hansen J statistic 2.424 2.716 2.047 1.769
P − value [0.489] [0.437] [0.562] [0.621]
N 124 126 120 110
Notes: Parameters are estimated by instrumental variable regressions (GMM); In-
struments: 1st, 2nd and 3rd lag of log foreign fixed assets share in domestic fixed
assets and 2nd and 3rd lag of log relative wage; *** (**) [*] indicates significance
at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are defined as follows: wage bill share = wage bill of non-production work-
ers/manufacturing wage bill; ln (1+ K
FDI
KD
) = log [1 + (foreign fixed assets/domestic
fixed assets)]; ln KD = log (domestic fixed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private
firms/total number of firms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log
(import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
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Table B.3: Foreign Investors and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled
Labor in Poland
dependent variables: (1)-(4): relative employment, (5)-(8): relative wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) 0.101* 0.097* 0.091* 0.072 0.325** 0.333** 0.296** 0.385*
(0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.048) (0.159) (0.169) (0.148) (0.217)
ln W
S
WUS
-0.137 -0.157 -0.078 0.004
(0.203) (0.229) (0.191) (0.238)
ln KD 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.177 0.186 0.175 0.250
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.123) (0.134) (0.122) (0.175)
ln PRIV -0.014 -0.020 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 -0.040
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.032) (0.030) (0.042)
ln R&D 0.011** 0.011** -0.002 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
ln M -0.046 0.124
(0.029) (0.0101)
ln X 0.023 -0.085
(0.028) (0.069)
year dummies no no no no yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant -0.043 -0.045 -0.059 0.110 -2.170 -2.377 -2.195 -3.681
(0.713) (0.742) (0.717) (0.641) (2.782) (3.127) (2.812) (3.910)
Centered R2 0.903 0.903 0.880 0.882 0.816 0.808 0.829 0.827
Hansen J statistic 2.502 2.612 2.080 1.924 0.061 0.020 0.014 0.142
P-value [0.475] [0.455] [0.556] [0.588] [0.805] [0.886] [0.904] [0.707]
N 124 124 120 110 124 124 120 110
Notes: Parameters are estimated by instrumental variable regressions (GMM); Instruments: 1st,
2nd and 3rd lag of log foreign fixed assets share in domestic fixed assets and 2nd and 3rd lag of log
relative wage; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are
not shown. Variables are defined as follows: relative employment = number of non-production
workers/number of production workers; relative wage = wage of non-production workers/wage of
production workers; ln (1 + K
FDI
KD
) = log [1 + (foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets)]; ln KD
= log (domestic fixed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private firms/total number of firms); ln
R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
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Figure B. 1: Outsourcing, Relative Wages and Relative Employment in Aus-
tria.
          1 averages for the years 1995-2002
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Notes: Average annual changes in percentage points (1995-2002), sectors ranked by out-
sourcing; outsourcing defined in the narrow way.
Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Statistics Austria.
30
Figure B. 2: Outsourcing, Relative Wages and Relative Employment in
Poland.
ve
hi
cl
es
m
et
al
s
pl
as
ti
cs
w
oo
d
te
xt
ile
s
fo
od
pa
pe
r
m
in
in
g
co
ke
, 
oi
l
Share of Foreign Fixed Assets 
in Domestic Fixed Assets
-5%
15%
35%
55%
75%
95%
115%
m
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s
to
b
ac
co
R
T
V
 a
n
d
 c
om
m
. 
eq
u
ip
.
n
on
-m
et
al
li
c 
m
in
er
al
 p
ro
d
.
ru
b
b
er
 a
n
d
 p
la
st
ic
of
fi
ce
 a
n
d
 c
om
p
u
ti
n
g 
m
ac
h
.
el
ec
tr
ic
al
 m
ac
h
in
er
y
fo
od
fu
rn
it
u
re
; 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g 
n
.e
.c
.
ch
em
ic
al
s
w
oo
d
co
ke
m
ac
h
in
er
y 
an
d
 e
qi
u
p
m
en
t
re
cy
cl
in
g
m
et
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s
m
ed
.,
 p
re
ci
si
on
 a
n
d
 o
p
ti
ca
l 
in
st
r.
ot
h
er
 t
ra
n
sp
or
t 
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
p
ap
er
te
xt
il
es
le
at
h
er
p
u
b
li
sh
in
g 
an
d
 p
ri
n
ti
n
g
b
as
ic
 m
et
al
s
w
ea
ri
n
g 
ap
p
ar
el
Relative Employment
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
eh
ic
le
s
an
d
eq
u
ip
.
er
 a
n
d
as
ti
c
ct
ri
ca
l
h
in
er
y
u
re
;
ct
u
ri
n
g
w
oo
d
ry
 a
n
d
m
en
t
od
u
ct
s
n
sp
or
t
m
en
t
ex
ti
le
s
n
g 
an
d
in
g
w
ea
ri
n
g
p
p
ar
el
Relative Wages
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Note: Average annual changes in percentage points (1994-2002), sectors ranked by
foreign fixed assets share in domestic fixed assets.
Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Central Statis-
tical Office of Poland and PAIiIZ.
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